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Characteristics of Listed Property Trust Initial 
Public Offerings in Australia 1994 to 2008 
This paperfollows Dimovski and Brooks (2006a) who investigate the 
underpricing of Listed Property Trust (LPT) initial public offerings (lPOs) in 
Australia from 1994 to 1999. This study investigates Australian LPTs from 
January 1994 to June 2008 and reports a variety of descriptive statistics 
on 82 such IPOs. The study has two major findings, firstly that LPT IPOs 
listed after 1999 offered statistically significant underpricing returns to 
subscribers and secondly that post-I 999 LPT IPOs were subscribed much 
more quickly than those of 1994 to 1999. 
Introduction 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) of equity 
capital are a common occurrence in 
financial markets around the world. 
Companies and trusts looking for 
additional equity capital sell their shares 
or units to the investing public with the 
investing public subsequently owning a 
relatively liquid investment able to be sold 
on a stock exchange. While this financial 
transaction seems ordinary enough, the 
academic literature has uncovered the 
fact that extraordinary returns have 
been theoretically able to be earned, on 
average, by subscribers to these new 
issues. These returns are the result of the 
issue price of a company's shares being 
below the price at which the shares 
subsequently trade on the first day. The 
terms generally used to describe this are 
underpricing returns or simply underpricing. 
Some US industrial company IPO 
s.tudies [Ibbotson (1975), Ritter (1987), 
Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994)] 
reported average underpricing returns 
of between I 1.4% and 47.8%. Some 
Australian industrial company IPO studies 
[Finn and Higham (1988), Lee Taylor and 
Walter (1996) and Dimovski and Brooks 
(2004)] reported average underpricing 
average underpricing return to date at 
948.6% for Chinese A-class IPO shares 
between 1986 and 1996. Recall these are 
average returns theoretically able to be 
earned by subscribers to the IPO from 
the date of their sUbscription to the date 
of listing. 
Subscribers to listed property trust (LPT) 
and real estate investment trust (REIT) 
IPOs have not ach ieved anywhere near 
the average returns that subscribers to 
industrial company IPOs have earned. 
Wang, Chan and Gau (1992) report that 
US REIT IPOs during 1971 to 1988 had 
a 2.82% average overpricing while Ling 
and Ryngaert (1997) identifying US REIT 
IPOs during 1991 to 1994 report an 
average 3.6% underpricing. Dimovski and 
Brooks (2006a) identified that Australian 
LPT I POs during 1994,to 1999 offered 
an average return to subscribers that was 
not statistically different to zero. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) were the firSt 
to argue that underpricing was a function 
of the uncertainty about the value of 
the IPo. Essentially, the more uncertainty 
about the value of the issuing company's 
equity, the higher the underpricing 
required by the issuer. Wang, Chan and 
Gau (1992) concur and suggest that 
because REITs hold underlying real assets, 
returns of between 16.4% and 29.2%. Su these provide a useful basis of support 
. and Fleisher (1999) reported the largest " for the valuation of the IPo. 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine 
Australian LPT IPOs from January 
1994 to June 2008 to report a variety 
of descriptive statistics and to identify 
whether the post-I 999 LPT I POs 
continue to offer a return to subscribers 
that is not statistically different to zero. 
The primary equity capital raised in this 
period was during a steady to rising to 
even bull market. A period that is clearly 
different to the present market where 
the global financial crisis has delivered 
many severe blows to the listed property 
sector where debt capital raising has 
been difficult and liquidity has been vitally 
important. 
The study partitions the LPT IPOs into 
various categories and identifies the 
number of LPT IPOs that offered stapled 
securities, used underwriters and were 
involved in retail or office property trust 
activities. It also reports the mean, median 
minimum and maximum values for the 
gross proceeds raised, the net tangible 
assets offered compared to the issue 
price, the forecast dividend yields for the 
forthcoming year, the number of days 
from the date of the prospectus to the 
date of listing, the target percentage debt 
to assets of the trust, the percentage 
cost of the issue compared to the capital 
raised, the underpricing returns to 
subscribers and the amount of "money 
left" by the issuer. The amount of money 
left refers to the underpricing in cents 
per unit multiplied by the number of 
units offered. It represents the gross 
amount foregone by the issuer, hence 
the expression money left. -The .study 
contributes two major findings. Firstly it 
identifies that the post I 999-IPOs were 
different to the LPT IPOs of 1994 to 1999 
and offered an average 3.37% statistically 
significant return to subscribers. Secondly, 
post-I 999 IPOs were subscribed 
substantially more quickly than the LPT 
IPOs of 1994 to 1999. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. 
Section 2 briefly summarises some 
previous property trust and REIT IPO 
research. Section 3 identifies the data and 
its sources. Section 4 reports the results. 
Section 5 contains some concluding 
comments. 
Some previous property 
trust and REIT IPO ' 
research 
An early study examining the 
underpricing of REIT IPOs was by Wang, 
Chan and Gau ( 1992) who investigated 
87 US REIT IPOs during the period 1971 
to I 988.They report a surprising and 
somewhat difficult to explain statistically 
significant 2.82% overpricing to the initial 
subscribers. Wang, Chan and Gau (1992) 
suggest it may have been ignorance on 
the part of investors in these IPOs as to 
why they subscribed at all. 
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) investigated 
85 US REIT IPOs during 1991 to 1994 
to find a statistically significant 3.6% 
underpricing return to subscribers in 
these IPOs. Ling and Ryngaert ( 1997) 
argued that Rock's (1986) "winner's 
curse" may have operated in the 
REIT IPO market.The winner's curse 
hypothesis suggests that better informed 
investors buy underpriced issues and 
do not offer to buy overpriced ones. 
Because of the limited amount of new 
equity available, the better informed 
and likely more influential investors are 
able to buy a larger proportion of the ' 
more profitable IPOs while the less 
well informed and likely less influential 
investors are able to buy a smaller 
proportion of the more profitable issues 
and a larger proportion of the poorer 
issues - hence the winner's curse. 
Dimovski and Brooks (2006a) examined 
37 Australian LPT IPOs during 1994 
101999 and reported amedian ' 
underpricing return of zero and a 
mean underpricing return that was not 
statistically significantly different to zero. 
In examining money left characteristics, 
Dimovski and Brooks (2006b) speculated 
that post - 1999 LPT IPOs may offer 
higher underpricing returns than those 
of 1994 to 1999. The merging of the 
trustee and manager roles into a single 
Responsible Entity role was an important 
event at June 30, 2000.Dimovski and 
Brooks (2006b) argued that the removal 
of the trustee safeguard may result in 
more uncertainty about the value of the 
REIT IPO and hence may result in higher 
underpricing. 
Essentially, the more 
uncertainty about the 
value of the issuing 
company's equity, the 
higher the underpricing 
required by the issuer. 
Data and sources 
The Connect 4 Company Prospectuses 
database was used for the majority of the 
data.This database provides electronic 
copies of the prospectuses used by 
companies and trusts in raising their new 
equity capital.The following data has been 
extracted from each of the LPT IPOs: 
• the amount of equity capital raised 
• whether the issue was stapled 
• whether the major type of real estate 
activity conducted was retail or office 
• whether the issue was underwritten 
• the expected net tangible assets 
compared to the issue price at the 
conclusion of the IPO 
• the forecast dividend yield for the next 
forthcoming full year 
• the number of days taken from the 
date of the prospectus to the date of 
listing 
• the forecast target debt to equity ratio 
of the LPT 
• the cost of the issue as a proportion 
of the capital raised. 
To determine underpricing returns and 
money left by the issuer, it was necessary 
to obtain the closing price of the units 
on the first day of listing.Theseciosing 
prices were obtained from the Netquote' 
Information Services database and some 
were verified with The Australian Financial 
Review newspaper. Underpricing returns 
were calculated as the closing price on 
the first day minus the issue price, divided 
by the issue price, all then mUltiplied by 
I 00 over I to derive the percentage 
return. Recall money left was the 
underpricing in cents multiplied by the 
number of units issued. 
Results 
Of the 82 property trust IPOs during 
January 1994 to June 2008 48 were 
underpriced, 14 showed no underpricing 
and 20 were overpriced.The total 
amount of new equity capital raised for 
the period was $14.015 billion. 
Table I reports various descriptive 
characteristics for the full sample and for , 
selected sub-samples of the data. A total 
of 14 LPT IPOs offered stapled securities, 
I 5 were involved in retail activities as 
their major type of activity and 20 in 
office activities. A total of 68 of the 82 
(or 83%) were underwritten.The average 
LPT IPO raised about $171 million of 
new equity from the IPO while the 
median capital raising was $103 million. 
The largest LPT IPO raised $790 million. 
The capital raisings took between 22 and 
175 days from the date of the prospectus 
to the date the entity was listed, with the 
average of 57.5 days.The LPT IPOs in 
turn offered average net tangible assets of 
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around 93.7 cents for each dollar raised 
and forecast an average dividend yield of 
9% for the next forthcoming full year. The 
majority of LPT IPOs were quite keen 
to leverage and the sample identified a 
mean average 48% debt to asset ratio 
and a median debt to asset ratio of 49%. 
The average issue costs were around 
6.3% of the capital raised but ranged from 
a minimum of 1.6% to 16.7%.The mean 
underpricing return theoretically available 
to subscribers was a statistically significant 
2.4% while the mean amount of money 
left by the issuing entity was slightly over 
$4.8 million. 
33 were underwritten and only four of 
which offered stapled securities) in the 
earlier period and 45 (of which 35 were 
underwritten and of which 10 offered 
The winner's curse 
hypothesis suggests that 
better informed investors 
buy underpriced issues 
and do not offer to buy 
overpriced ones. 
stapled securities) in the later period. The 
earlier period IPOs were a little larger 
Panel A ofTa:bl~ I partitions the data by . . on ·average than the later period IPOs 
(mean and median of $193 million and 
the issue period. The first period was 
the 1994 to 1999 IPO period which 
involved both trustees and managers in 
the LPTs and the second was the post-
1999 period which invol",ed only a single 
responsible entity managing the affairs of 
each LPT.There were 371POs (of which 
$1 17 million compared to $153 million 
and $100 million) and took a little longer 
to list (mean and median of 69.6 days 
and 58 days compared to 47.6 days 
'and 45 days).The earlier LPT IPOs 
offered broadly similar net tangible assets 
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coverage compared to the issue price at 
around 95 cents per dollar and broadly 
similar forecast dividend yields and debt 
to equity ratios at about 9% and 48% 
respectively. Interestingly issue costs were 
on average less at 5.4% for the earlier 
IPOs than the latter ones at about 7%. 
The underpricing return and money left 
characteristics of the earlier IPOs are 
statistically quite different.The earlier 
IPOs did not allow underpricing returns 
to subscribers and the median money 
left was zero. Later IPOs allowed a 3.37% 
mean underpricing return and the median 
money left was nearly $1.5 million while 
the mean money left was OVer $4.7 
million and significant at the 5% level. 
Panel B ofTable I partitions the data by 
issue size and then by issue period.The 
major features here are that larger IPOs 
(over $100 million) are all underwritten 
. . 
regardless of the issue period; the time 
to list was substantially shorter for the 
post-I 999 LPT IPOs regardless of the 
size; issue costs for larger LPT IPOs 
appeared to be lower in the earlier 
period; underpricing returns were higher 
_ for smaller IPOs in the post 1999 period 
than in the earlier period (where a mean 
1.1 % overpricing occurred, and generally 
no money is left by the issuers) . 
Panel C ofT able I investigates stapled 
securities overall and by issue period. 
Stapled securities generally consist of a 
unit in a trust and a share in a company. 
The unit and the share are generally 
not tradeable without the other. The 
trust is likely to be holder of some 
income-producing real estate while the 
company is likely to deal in property 
development activities. Of the 14 stapled 
LPT IPO entities, 13 were underwritten 
(the one that was not was only seeking 
$800,000 of public money), and were of 
the larger LPT IPO variety (raising mean 
gross proceeds of $137 million), listing in 
around 50 days. Interestingly though while 
the larger LPT IPOs offered a significant 
mean 2.9% underpricing return, these 
stapled ones offered a return statistically 
no different to zero. 
Conclusion 
This study investigated 82 LPT IPOs in 
Australia during January 1994 to June 
2008. The descriptive results suggest 
that subscribers to the LPT IPOs after 
1999 that intended to sell on the first 
day. on average, could achieve small but 
significant underpricing returns. It appear::; 
that the post-1999 LPT IPOs offered 
. some uncertainty about their value, as in 
the US, but such very low underpricing 
also suggests that the underlying 
property assets for the Australian LPT 
IPOs may well be a base of support for 
the valuation of these IPOs. It is also 
interesting that the post-I 999 IPOs were 
subscribed to and listed more quickly 
than those of 1994 to- 1999. 
Of course not only has the name now 
changed for these listed property trusts 
to the more universal term of"Real 
Estate Investment Trust" (or REIT) but 
financial markets have dramatically altered 
in recent times. The global financial crisis 
has hit REIT s particularly hard. Instead 
of IPO capital raisings, the sector has 
concentrated on secondary equity capital 
raising to shore up balance sheets and 
lower gearing ratios. Ben Wilmot of the 
The Australian Financial Review of July 28, 
2009, notes that the Australian REIT (or 
A-REIT) sector has raised around 
$14 billion of secondary equity capital 
from October 2008 to June 2009.This 
is an extraordinary amount of equity 
capital injection but then these are indeed 
extraordinary times. • 
The global financial crisis 
has hit RE/Ts particularly 
hard. Instead of IPO capital 
raisings, the sector has 
concentrated on secondary 
equity capital raising to 
shore up balance sheets and 
lower gearing ratios. 
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